Low-Tax
Jurisdictions Are Not Money Laundering Havens
- Center for Freedom & Prosperity
Dirty money is more likely to be laundered in
high-tax nations than in tax havens. That is the conclusion of an
article released by the Center for Freedom and Prosperity. The article
cited reports of the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency,
and Internal Revenue Service, all of which independently assess whether
countries are money laundering centers and/or have systems that make
them vulnerable to dirty money.
By Daniel J. Mitchell
In the aftermath of September 11, many policy makers assumed that
terrorists were hiding their money in so-called tax havens. Investigators
have since discovered, however, that the terrorists relied on the
banking systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
and various nations in the Middle East for the vast majority of their
financial transactions.
In spite of stereotypes formed by reading John Grisham novels, tax
havens do not attract a significant portion of the world's dirty money.
The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF - of which the U.S. is a member) and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) each independently assess the extent to which
a jurisdictions attracts - or has the potential to attract - dirty
money. Some low-tax jurisdiction are on these lists, but the accompanying
table shows that they are clearly outnumbered by high-tax nations.
21/01/2001
Low-Tax Jurisdictions Are Not Money Laundering Havens
- Center for Freedom and Prosperity
Dirty money is more likely to be laundered in high-tax nations
than in tax havens. That is the conclusion of an article released
by the Center for Freedom and Prosperity. The article cited reports
of the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Internal
Revenue Service, all of which independently assess whether countries
are money laundering centers and/or have systems that make them vulnerable
to dirty money.
By Daniel J. Mitchell
In the aftermath of September 11,
many policy makers assumed that terrorists were hiding their money
in so-called tax havens. Investigators have since discovered, however,
that the terrorists relied on the banking systems of the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany, and various nations in the Middle East
for the vast majority of their financial transactions.
In spite of stereotypes formed by reading John Grisham novels, tax
havens do not attract a significant portion of the world's dirty money.
The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF - of which the U.S. is a member) and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) each independently assess the extent to which
a jurisdictions attracts - or has the potential to attract - dirty
money. Some low-tax jurisdiction are on these lists, but the accompanying
table shows that they are clearly outnumbered by high-tax nations.
As the table indicates, every money laundering
rating system finds that non-tax havens outnumber tax havens. It is
especially instructive to examine the numbers in parentheses. These
figures indicate the number of jurisdictions in each category that
were given a clean bill of health by the IRS, and they show that the
so-called tax havens received significantly better grades than their
high-tax brethren.
There is no evidence to suggest that tax havens are a magnet for dirty
money. This does not mean every low-tax jurisdiction has a perfect
track record. After all, no country with a significant financial services
sector is immune to money laundering. But it is clear that tax havens
are neither the source nor the destination for a disproportionate
share of the world's criminal proceeds.
Tax Havens and Money Laundering
Tax havens attract wealth, but most of the money is institutional
investment. Bermuda, for instance, is a leading center for the insurance
industry. Luxembourg and Switzerland are world leaders in managing
mutual fund assets. The Cayman Islands is near the top in almost all
facets of financial services and also draws a substantial amount of
bank-to-bank deposits. American corporations make extensive use of
offshore regimes, earning almost one-third of their profits in low-tax
jurisdictions.
Individual investors also utilize tax havens, but very little of this
money has criminal origins. Instead, it represents legitimate investment
by people seeking sound money management, asset protection, and lower
tax bills. This last feature is controversial, to be sure, but only
because many high-tax nations assert the right to tax income earned
outside their borders and get upset when low-tax nations do not help
them enforce their tax laws.
There are several reasons why criminals are unlikely to rely on tax
havens. On a practical level, it is very difficult to transfer money
to a low-tax jurisdiction unless the funds already are in a financial
institution. Yet if the criminal money is in a bank, the laundering
already has taken place. So why bother going "offshore?"
Criminals also avoid tax havens because of the added risk. Shifting
money across borders-and then back "onshore" when the funds
are needed-significantly increases the probability of detection. The
United Nations has even acknowledged that criminals avoid so-called
tax havens because they are a "red flag" for law enforcement.
Terrorists are even less likely to utilize tax havens since they are
motivated by hate rather than tax minimization and/or asset protection.
High-Tax Nations and Money Laundering
By its very definition, money laundering is hard to measure, so any
effort to pinpoint where it takes place necessarily involves speculation.
Nonetheless, many "onshore" experts acknowledge that the
real problem is in their own backyards. The FATF admits, for instance,
that criminal "funds are usually processed relatively close to
the under-lying activity; often...in the country where the funds originate."
And since most of the world's criminal activity takes place in North
America and Europe, it should come as no surprise that tax havens
are not major money laundering centers.
Unfortunately, the same thing cannot be said about high-tax nations.
According to a recent article in Government Executive, a publication
for U.S. policy makers, "The International Monetary Fund estimates
that about $600 billion is laundered each year globally. Estimates
of U.S. money-laundering traffic hover at $300 billion, including
about $60 billion in drug money alone." A more recent article
in the FBI's May, 2001 Law Enforcement Bulletin comes to a similar
conclusion. The author noted that "...not only does the amount
[of money laundered] lie somewhere between $500 billion and $1 trillion,
but that half is being laundered through U.S. banks." And a recent
report issued by one of the top fraud recovery firms in Europe estimates
that the United States is the source of nearly 50 percent of the world's
dirty money. The same study reveals that there is only one so-called
tax haven among the top 10 jurisdictions where dirty money is invested.
High-tax nations, like their low-tax counterparts, do have laws against
money laundering. Unfortunately, they are not very successful. The
U.S. Treasury Department estimates that 99.9 percent of the criminal
money in the United States is laundered successfully. Other OECD nations
have equally poor records. Dirty money in Germany almost always escapes
detection, while the United Kingdom admits that more than 99 percent
of criminal money in the City of London is successfully laundered.
High-Tax Nations Versus Low-Tax Nations
None of the government bodies that rate money-laundering vulnerability
include representation from low-tax jurisdictions. Three are agencies
of the U.S. government and the fourth - the FATF - is part of the
OECD, which is notorious for its anti-tax haven initiative. Yet these
four groups independently have concluded that low-tax jurisdictions
do not attract a disproportionate share of dirty money.
Indeed, they almost surely have better track records than high-tax
nations.
Consider, for example, the CIA's list of money laundering centers.
According to the agency, only four out of the 41 OECD-identified "tax
havens" fall into this category. This is considerably less than
the 11 non-tax havens that received this label from the CIA - including
the United States and the United Kingdom. Even if the list is expanded
to jurisdictions that merely are considered "vulnerable"
to money laundering, there are only five more "tax havens"
on that list compared to another six high-tax nations.
The State Department's list is much bigger than the CIA list, but
the results do not change. The diplomats estimate that 14 tax havens
are a primary concern for money laundering vulnerability. That may
sound like a lot, but it is insignificant compared to the 38 non-haven
jurisdictions that are on the list. Once again, the United States
and United Kingdom receive the lowest possible grade.
Looking at the State Department's list of "secondary" jurisdictions,
the pattern remains. Sixteen low-tax jurisdictions are listed, but
this is less than one-half the number of high-tax countries that are
in this category.
Even the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list contains a number
of surprises. There are eight "tax havens" on the FATF blacklist,
but this is fewer than the 11 non-havens that are on the list. The
FATF list is especially interesting because the organization is an
adjunct body of the OECD. As such, the FATF list is widely viewed
as being politically tainted by a desire to target low-tax jurisdictions.
Yet even with this biased perspective, FATF branded more high-tax
nations than low-tax nations as being "non-cooperative"
in the battle against money laundering. The balance would have been
even more weighted toward high-tax countries if FATF was willing to
list its own members as "non-cooperative." According to
the organization's recent self-assessment survey, only 10 of 29 members
met all of FATF's criteria, and four members - the United States,
Canada, Japan, and Mexico - received failing grades.
Last but not least, the Internal Revenue Service determines whether
a jurisdiction has effective know-your-customer laws when deciding
to grant "qualified intermediary" status to foreign financial
institutions. Of all the agencies, the IRS would be most likely to
be hard-nosed, yet 19 of the OECD's supposed tax havens have received
the agency's blessing, with another two awaiting approval (most, if
not all, of the others have not bothered to apply). Every major financial
center has received QI status, including the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas,
the Channel Islands, Panama, Liechtenstein, the British Virgin Islands,
Monaco, Gibraltar, Barbados, and the Netherlands Antilles.
Conclusion
The International Monetary Fund recently announced that it wants to
help a country upgrade its money-laundering laws. But the nation the
IMF is targeting is not Liechtenstein, Panama, or the Bahamas. It
is the United States. This does not mean, of course, that anything
is wrong with American laws. The bureaucracies that review money-laundering
laws, after all, seem oblivious to cost-benefit analyses. They also
seem to completely disregard the value of personal privacy and legal
protections against unreasonable search and seizure. And perhaps most
important, they apparently do not assess whether new laws will help
catch criminals. A former Treasury Department official recently admitted,
for instance, that the money-laundering provisions in the new PATRIOT
legislation in the United States would not have detected the September
11 terrorists.
Punishing criminals and deterring future crime is a core responsibility
of government. To properly carry out this function, however, lawmakers
should make reasoned decisions using the best data. Several U.S. government
agencies and one international bureaucracy have analyzed the problem
of money laundering and these groups have unambiguously concluded
that low-tax jurisdictions are neither the source nor the destination
for a disproportionate share of the world's dirty money. It remains
to be seen, however, whether this reduces the amount of demagoguery
against tax havens.
Daniel J. Mitchell is the McKenna Senior Fellow in Political
Economy at The Heritage Foundation.
The Center for Freedom and Prosperity Foundation is a U.S. based public
policy, research, and educational organization operating under Section
501(C)(3). It is privately supported, and receives no funds from any
government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other
contract work.
17/11/2001
PREPARATION
FOR THE NEXT WAR: A NEW MINDSET NEEDED
By Edwin J. Adams
International Economic Consultant
The news review
From all TV accounts, the war in Afghanistan has gone rather well
what with the Taliban finest desperately departing Kabul without the
much feared possibility of house to house combat. Alas, oh that the
news were half as good in the next war. The very last event that the
airline, hotel and other tourist-dependent industries needed was an
airline crash but that is what they got on November 12 with a high
lost of life and a few, for good measure, on the ground as well. This,
coming on top of earlier news that the US economy had contracted in
the third quarter and unemployment had soared to 5.4%. Clearly, the
time has come to take this war against depression every bit as seriously
as the one against terrorism.
Situation report
On no front was the news especially encouraging. While Greenspan announced
the tenth cut in the Fed Funds rate to an amazingly low 2 percent,
no one could discern that these cuts had made any impact so far. Many
observers remarked, however, that these cuts always needed 9-11months
before they could hope to impact the economy. But neither was the
news good from Japan. The Bank of Japan projects contracting output
and falling prices into the year 2003. Not surprisingly, there were
many analysts expressing total dissatisfaction with this state of
affairs. More immediately ominous was the widespread concern for Argentina.
Almost all have somewhat belatedly agreed that the current situation
is unsustainable. The bigger difficulty, however, is to agree a solution:
is it to be dollarisation, devaluation, default or any of a myriad
options proposed by global experts? The critical issue is that with
a $132 billion national debt and most other debt designated in US
dollars any monetary policy change is sure to lead to considerable
financial chaos. Finally, the World Bank reported that it expected
growth in developing countries to fall from 5.5% in 2000 to as low
as 2.9% this year.
Diagnosis remains
Regular readers of this column would, of course, not be surprised
by these turn of events. For I have already made it clear that the
monetary and financial systems at work are flawed and such chaos is
to be expected. Until we agree a global monetary standard with an
appropriately devised monetary order we shall remain vulnerable to
the growing economic setbacks that we continue to observe across the
world.
Next society: new institutions/ theories
In the midst of it all, The Economist newspaper (November3, 2001)
has provided us all with the views of that great man of letters and
extraordinary vision, Peter Drucker. The subject: The next society,
a survey of the near future. He warns us that: "It will be quite
different from the society of the late 20th century, and also different
from what most people expect. Much of it will be unprecedented. And
most of it is already here or is rapidly emerging." He concludes
by confidently asserting that: "The central feature of the next
society, as of its predecessors, will be new institutions and new
theories, ideologies and problems." (Emphasis mine) My essential
thrust over the last six months or so has been to hammer home the
message that in this hour we need to discover and implement the new
economic paradigm. But what do we observe? In the face of declining
economic performance do we intensify and extend our search to discover
the new? No! Most economists have shamelessly returned to Keynesianism
en masse speaking positively about the plethora of such initiatives
launched or pending in the US and elsewhere.
Change, however, is inevitable. The difficulty is that it need not
be gentle. For it to be so, there must be greater effort at looking
afresh at the worlds economies and paying a greater attention
to those providing new pathways to the future. Your columnist just
happens to be one of those with an architectural design for our economic
future. You shall shortly get an opportunity to learn of this new
pathway. In the meantime let the period of new institution building
based on new theories begin.November 16, 2001.
24/10/2001
THE WAR AGAINST GLOBAL DEPRESSION
By Edwin Adams
Economic Consultant
HYPOTHESIS
The war on terrorism against Afghanistan, by all second hand accounts,
seems to be going quite well. The war on the other front, as the October
29 issue of Fortune magazine refers to it, is not going so well at
all. That is, the battle to revive the US, and indeed the world economy,
has failed to respond, so far, to the energetic ministrations of the
Federal Reserve. We can expect more from him in the future though
with far less irrational exuberance about the efficacy of the FOMCs
actions in turning the economy around. As for the actions of the US
legislators, it is reported that they are working on a package of
tax cuts and benefits of the order of $155 billion. The problem is
that the US economy GDP is over $ 10,000 billion. The hope, no doubt,
is that being the patriotic folks that all Americans are; they will
proceed to do their bit to multiply the impact of Congress largesse.
Herein lies the problem; when one allow ones eye to gratuitously
and carelessly drift from the tightly scripted play on stage to the
several unwelcome actors in the wings of the stage impatient to have
their turn, one gets distinctly uncomfortable. Could we be heading
into a depression of 1930s proportion? I hope not; but there are unmistakable
signs. We need to declare a war against this.
THE EVIDENCE
In the face of so many professional economists confidently assuring
their audiences that an up-turn should be on the way by the second
half of next year your columnist, I am afraid, cannot concur. There
is simply too much evidence pointing to a contrary state of affairs.
It is necessary to stress, in this period of general gloom, that I
believe that we have an opportunity as never before to shape the 21st
century. To paraphrase President Bushs position taken in his
major speech after the disaster: the issue is whether one is committed
to a war against global depression or one is indifferent to its looming
presence and therefore against our planned retaliation.
CRITICAL DIMENSIONS
There are macro, micro and institutional dimensions to this incipient
crisis.
The macro element
While the plans of official Washington are to stimulate spending,
the more responsible economists remind us that Americas businesses
and households are already deeply in hock. The private deficit at
6 percent of GDP is said to be exceptionally high on a historical
basis. Indeed, household debt at the end of the first quarter had
risen to 101.5% of disposable income even while their net worth had
shrunk by 3.4trillion dollars.
The US itself had a net international debtor position of -$2,187 billion
at the end of 2000. We could also itemize the situations in Japan
and Argentina as well which are even gloomier but I believe you have
gotten the picture.
The Micro element
What should be even more disturbing to the general public, and is
not, is the fact that there are ever fewer sectors of the economy
where we confidently know how to create value and or provide the desired
quality at an affordable cost. This is particularly so in the economies
of the US and the UK. I list below the economically defective sectors:
SECTOR COUNTRY COMMENT
Healthcare US and UK Unable to meet the needs of 40 million; those
who have recently lost their jobs will most likely have lost their
health care.
The quality is cause for widespread concern as was made manifest at
the last general elections. Its worst aspect is the lengthy wait for
surgical treatment.
Education US and UK The well off and the teachers union are
the only groups not complaining about the education system.
Air transportation US What can one say that has not been said already
except that the industry now have the Sept. 11, event as the perfect
cover.
Telecom US and UK Even the businessmens organs-Fortune and Businessweek-
have finally admitted the Telecommunication Act 1996 has been a disaster.
There remains a growing unmet need for broadband services.
Electricity US and UK The Californian deregulation disaster should
at least bring some measure of sanity to this sector for a while.
Rail UK Railtrack, the privatised rail-network infrastructure company
after many accidents in its short life has collapsed into bankruptcy
five years later.
Agriculture US After farmers were given the freedom to farm back in
1996, the US Congress now feels it necessary to sign into law a $173
billion-ten year farm-aid package.
E-commerce US One hopes the future is more profitable than its recent
past.
Financial services US There are many, many unhappy clients.
Though the bulk of mainstream economists pretend not to notice, I
suggest that the foregoing table tells a rather grim story. The foundation
and basis for economic growth are broken beyond simple repair. To
begin the turnaround process, however, we must at least admit that
we have a problem. Would they, would you?
The institutional element
If you were one of the optimistic ones who invested in the emerging
markets of the world since 1994 you would certainly be sadder and
wiser at this time. You have had to contend with stock market crashes,
bank runs, government collapses, currency collapses and debt defaults.
This experience just confirms that globalisation is simply a philosophical
wish list, what remains to be accomplished is the crafting of an institutional
framework necessary for the achievement of such wishes.
THE WAR AGAINST GLOBAL DEPRESSION
In every democratic society, the peoples representatives should
be given the opportunity to express their viewpoint before any war
is declared let alone fought. Accordingly, I shall give you the opportunity
to have your say before I proceed. Be warned it is unlikely that many
institutions will be left standing in their current shape when this
war is over. On the other hand, you and your children can look forward
to years of prosperity, unparalleled with any thing we have experienced
in the 20th century. Note, however, that I shall take your silence
as consent to proceed with the presentation of my battle strategy.
E-mails to neweconmodel@hotmail.com.
10/08/2001
GLOBAL ECONOMIC
WOES WORSEN: ECONOMICS IN THE DOCK
By
Edwin J. Adams,
Economic Consultant
OLD FASHIONED ECONOMIST
In Keyness effort to dethrone the ideas and sway of classical
economists in the 1930s, he reportedly mocked those so called practical
men of affairs who felt they were totally free of the influence of
economic theories when in fact their beliefs were based on those of
some long defunct economist. A number of events over the past week
have caused me to reflect on this. Only this time it is not practical
men that are the cause for concern but more ominously, the economists
of our time.
NEW DIFFICULTIES, OLD SOLUTIONS
Everywhere one looks where there are economic difficulties, you are
sure to hear some economist or policy maker complacently proposing
the same routine, increasingly ineffective, solutions. Nevertheless,
the September 11, atrocities have rather quickly deepened our economic
woes so that I do not expect it will be long before ever more people
realize that the economic emperor has no clothes. More specifically,
if we believe our public officials, there are no problems that confronts
any major economy that cannot be remedied by aggressive interest rate
cuts or higher levels of fiscal expenditure or relief. Though economists
in recent times pay little attention to Keynes, they are, however,
firmly wedded to the solutions he proposed over six decades ago. Yet
if we are to escape economic disaster, it is necessary that economists
be more open to the need for a fresh perspective in the new circumstances
that now prevail.
It is not often one gets the opportunity to observe a respectful adult
relationship between a G7 country and a developing country let alone
between such and an Offshore Financial Centre (OFC). But this was
the occasion September 26, 2001 when Mr. Howard Davies, Chairman,
Financial Services Authority(FSA) of the United Kingdom spoke to a
gathering in Douglas, Isle of Man (IOM). What came across clearly,
is that from what he said to his IOM audience, the powers that be
seem intent on using OFCs as scapegoats for every financial evil that
they confront in their country or the world economy.
SCAPEGOAT
This is one of the many issues Mr. Davies addressed: "In short,
offshore centres will need to do much more in the coming years to
demonstrate that they can and do meet international standards of best
practice. If that does not happen, then the future is bleak."
This seems reasonable until you realize that it does not represent
the best way forward. Standards are important and necessary but it
is not a requirement that we should all follow one level of quality
standard.
He had more to report, however, and it was even more disturbing:
And pressure is not solely related to the tragedy at the World Trade
Center. 3 weeks ago, before the hijackings, the FSA hosted the most
recent meeting of the Financial Stability Forum. The Forum was set
up a
couple of years ago, on an initiative from Gordon Brown
. The
agendas cover a broad front, from the activities of highly leveraged
institutions like hedge funds, through the financial situation in
crisis-hit emerging markets like Turkey and Argentina, to the health
of the Japanese banking system.
But it was striking that, at this months meeting, the subject
which generated the most heat was the role of offshore centres. A
number of representatives believed that such progress as has been
made towards higher regulatory standards was simply inadequate, and
that more political measures needed to be taken. (Emphasis mine)
Regular readers of this column will no doubt understand my consternation
at such a viewpoint. It is not that regulatory standards are not to
be improved, but as I have said in previous articles, it is just not
the most important item on the worlds agenda. Is this any different
than officers having the sailors rearrange the deck chairs on the
decks of the ill-fated Titanic.
NEW SOLUTIONS REVEALED
Your columnist believes that he may have the opportunity to finally
confront this dangerous thinking. There shall shortly be available
for sale a report that, I believe, will be quite vital at this time.
In preparation since before the September 11 incident, it is being
revamped to reflect current events. The report is entitled: The U.S.
Economy 2002 Economic Forecast: Identifying the Paradigm Shift. It
brings together all our previous research to show that a robust recovery
from this slowdown on the basis of the usual Keynesian inspired fiscal
and monetary policies will prove unequal to the task at hand. After
all, how many Japans do we need to demonstrate this? Let me have your
observations, orders, and responses sent to neweconmodel@hotmail.com.
09/27/2001
THE WAR ON TERRORISM: WHAT ARE OFCs TO DO?
By Edwin J. Adams,
Economic Consultant
There is no doubt about it, we live
in a very uncertain, and I might add, an increasingly unsafe world.
Your columnists was excitedly dealing with the ramifications of his
findings in economics and its potential implications when I, like
so many others, was rudely stunned by the dastardly acts of the terrorists
in America on September 11. If nothing else, it has forced me to undertake
a critical review of all my assumptions and outlook for the future.
As these relate to the Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs), there can
be no doubt that there will be more changes ahead.
The US Treasury Secretary has made it abundantly clear that his administration
was prepared to financially strangle the terrorist networks around
the world. This means, in part, that wherever the terrorists hold
offshore bank accounts, the US and its allies were likely to bring
pressure on the authorities in these OFC jurisdictions to have such
accounts sequestrated. One fears that in the post-WTC era that there
is likely to be strong worldwide support for such actions. President
Bush, at any rate, has made it absolutely clear in his speech last
night, to paraphrase him, that those who are not seen to be actively
supporting his countrys efforts in this venture would be considered
as part of the problem.
This column has as one of its major objectives, as regular readers
would be aware, a strong desire and interest in supporting regulatory
fairplay so that our caution would be that any action contemplated
be applied across the entire breadth of financial centres worldwide.
In the short term though, given the rapidly emerging events in the
US and global economies any action against terrorism needs to be analysed
to assess its impact on our fragile global financial system. This
should come as no surprise, the OFCs play a vital part in the global
financial system and by extension I am interested in any issue that
impacts the financial system. My last article, accordingly, looked
at the adverse impact of the lack of a global monetary standard on
the global financial system and the failing attempt to forge a new
global financial architecture.
In this regard the news is not very good, the events of September
11 have severely impacted what is said to be the world largest industry:
The tourism and travel industry. US hotels now complain of low occupancy
rates, airlines are laying-off workers, some travelers are reacting
by completely avoiding cruise ships. For an economy that was already
showing signs of slowing this seems ominous. To add to it all, the
continuous announcements of job cuts across the US economy and the
ongoing plunge in the stockmarkets in the US and elsewhere will depress
the US consumers confidence and spending. Clearly, the complacent
confidence policy makers continue to display in Keynesian type answers
to the economys woes is misplaced. I strongly suggest that new
approaches will be needed to secure an economic turnaround on this
occasion.
I believe my column can be of tremendous use in this area because
I am now engaged in producing the a report entitled: "The
US Economy 2002 Economic Forecast: Identifying the Paradigm Shift."
The essence of the report is that the recovery cannot be achieved
simply by interest rate cuts and deficit spending. As we should have
learned from Japan, the situation cries out for new approaches. Excerpts
will appear in the next column. I look forward to your comments; I
can be contacted at: "neweconmodel@hotmail.com.
BREAKING COMMENTARY
07/09/2001
THREAT
TO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: NOT THE OFCs, BUT KEYNESS
ERROR
By Edwin J. Adams,
Economic Consultant
While
preparing a paper recently to coincide with the thirtieth anniversary
of the collapse of Bretton Woods, your columnist stumbled upon what
I refer to at this time as a major finding. That is that, the man
himself, none other than John Maynard Keynes, he of "General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" fame, had made a major
error. He had misdiagnosed the cause of the terrible economic and
employment slump in the 1930s. But before you move on thinking this
is a bit of economic minutiae that only an academic can enjoy, be
warned! This issue, in fact, goes to the heart of the matter of whether
you will still have a job next year and the security or otherwise
of your pension savings.
You will recall, as I have addressed often in this column, my view
that the worlds financial authorities are somewhat misguided
in their wholesale attack on Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs). If
we are to believe the OECD and the IMF, they, the OFC, are the biggest
current danger to the stability of the international financial system.
The recent findings I made, however, will expose how truly misguided
these bodies are. How can one achieve stability in the international
financial system before you achieve global monetary order? An historical
review will demonstrate this only too clearly.
In the period prior to the First World War there was tremendous global
trade and capital flows, so much so that Great Britain exported capital
to the tune of 9% of her GDP. And the glue that held it all together
was the global monetary order of the time geared to satisfy the demands
of the gold standard. Equally, in the world economic boom of the post-WW
II era that lasted for a quarter century, we had, once again, a global
monetary order, this time mediated by the IMF, geared to satisfying
the demands of the gold exchange standard. What global monetary standard
do we have in place in this era of globalisation?
There is no global monetary standard at this time; what we have at
this time, everywhere we look, are countries in dire economic distress
because of the absence of such a monetary standard. Argentina is about
to begin its fourth year of recession even as they seek to undertake
yet more painful reforms to comply with the terms of the latest IMF
US$8 billion loan. This will clearly not fly while they continue with
a monetary system suffocating within their currency board straitjacket.
But isnt it the responsibility of the IMF to ensure the on-going
suitability of countries, and the worlds monetary order?
Isnt this more important that another large financial rescue
package? On this note, what is the IMF going to advise about Japan
which has been in an economic slump for over ten years?
Here is a country that sorely needs a robust global monetary standard
and order. Her banks are under great strain because of large loan
losses compounded by low profits caused in part by nominal interest
rates that are close to 0%. Clearly, the Japanese people need to have
the freedom to export their savings and so enjoy a much higher return,
leading in turn to higher domestic interest rates and higher bank
profits. This would not happen unless the world enjoys and we are
all confident and comfortable with a credible global monetary standard
and order.
This is where I have to return to Keyness error. If he had properly
diagnosed the cause of the collapse of the gold standard and the ensuing
employment slump in the 1930s, he would have proposed a different
arrangement for the Bretton Woods monetary order in 1944. As it is,
that order was doomed to fail and fail it did in 1971. Now we see
even the largest economies: the US, Europe and Japan, are now facing
major economic dislocations because of this error. Realistically though,
what is the road ahead?
It is very much up to you out there! Your columnist can only do so
much; the last time I sought your response you were slow off the mark.
This, however, is far more important. Even as I write, and as you
are very well aware, the worlds economic and financial systems
are under great strain. Its my intention to provide a public service
through the holding of an International Monetary Conference, October
25-26, 2001 where you would have the opportunity to respond to my
"Theory of Production Discontinuity" which furnishes the
theoretical basis of my arguments concerning Keyness error.
The findings of the conference can then be sent to the IMF to assist
them in their efforts on the way to a new international financial
architecture.
Next week I shall provide more on this new path breaking theory and
further details of the proposed conference. Until then you can reach
me at neweconmodel@hotmail.com
(See website:
www.worldoffshorebanks.com for previous issues.)
REGULATORY STANDARDS
EVALUATION MODEL
MEASURING REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS
Part 2
By Edwin
J. Adams, Economic Consultant
In the last few years and particularly
in the preceding two, the public has been overwhelmed by the sheer volume
of largely negative information made available on Offshore Financial
Centres (OFC). Yet, OFCs represent a perfect market response to meeting
the commercial needs of potential clients. This is normally applauded
by all OECD leaders. It is taken for granted, of course, that in any
financial service offered, the issue of legality would be strictly observed.
Indeed, the question needs to be asked as to why there have not been
global rules in place already to discourage such activities as money
laundering and tax evasion. One can perhaps wrongly come to the conclusion
that at one point in history the powers that be did not wish to limit
the possibilities of the Swiss banking system.
As I have said in my first column,
however, my purpose is a more positive one than critiquing the activities
of the FATF, OECD or IMF. It is our dual-purpose to serve as a resource
to those using this site and secondly, to assist in the overall reform
of the global financial architecture.
SERVICE PRODUCTION
MODEL (SPM)
In this regard, I have been making use of
an analytical tool that I refer to as a Service Production Model (SPM)
over the last three years or so. This tool is used to forecast the number
or probability of defects per year in the functioning of any of the
major services in a particular country. This requires a reasonably good
knowledge of the countrys regulatory framework for the specific
service activity. I have enjoyed reasonably good success in the transportation
sector and I have now begun to make use of it in the financial sector.
Over the coming weeks, I shall, therefore, provide performance predictions
for the major onshore and offshore financial centres.
EVALUATING
YOUR EXPERIENCE
As you may have surmised already, it is my intention to give
you an opportunity to measure the relative effectiveness of this model.
The simplest method for accomplishing this task in an unbiased fashion
is to collect publicly, the number of deficiencies experienced as well
as those reported in the media. Accordingly, I have set out below
the approach for classifying and reporting to this site the various
deficiencies you have experienced in the use of any of the Offshore
Financial Centres or the other major financial centres.
TABLE 1
| CODE
|
REGULATORY
PERFORMANCE CATEGORY |
COMMENTS
|
| 1
|
Monitoring/
prevention of illegal activities. |
E.g.
Money laundering, etc. |
| 2
|
Protecting
the interest of consumers and other customers. |
Against
fraud, serious service defects. |
| 3
|
Ensuring
the overall integrity of the financial system. |
Avoiding
the Asian financial crisis, circa 1997. |
| 4
|
The
regulatory system facilitates economic growth and development.
|
The
reg.requirements do not frustrate business initiatives and development
plans. |
| 5
|
The
regulatory system fosters global amity and equity. |
The
interest and concerns of all countries taken on board.
|
| 6
|
The
use of a good quality assurance system. |
The
facility for providing reliable third party service quality
evaluation. |
| 7
|
The
active pursuit of performance improvement. |
A
rising level of customer satisfaction experienced. |
| |
|
|
TABLE 2
| COUNTRY/
OFC |
SERVICE
|
REG.
DEFECT CODE |
RATING
|
| |
|
|
|
| Barbados
|
Banking
|
4
|
7
|
| |
|
|
|
| Bahamas
|
Insurance
|
6
|
3
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
USERS GUIDE
-
The seven categories given in
table 1 cover, I believe, all the major issues impacted by the regulatory
processes. You will need to identify which category is relevant
to your concern and select its appropriate code.
- On the basis of your experience, you are required
to determine a suitable rating where:
-
-Total dissatisfaction, and
(10) - Total satisfaction
I look forward to your active participation
in this exercise as I believe it will greatly assist in the development
of a sorely needed new global financial architecture. Please also let
me have your comments on our forum or at my e-mail address: neweconmodel@hotmail.com.
COLUMNIST
Wendesday June 20th (Part
1)
Evaluating
onshore and
offshore financial sectors
REGULATORY
STANDARDS EVALUATION MODEL(R. S. E. MODEL)
USED
INTRODUCTORY ISSUE
By EDWIN ADAMS - ECONOMIST
I welcome you to this section of "Worldoffshorebanks" web
site. As the name, REGULATORY STANDARDS EVALUATION MODEL(R. S. E.
MODEL), implies, this is meant to serve as an additional resource.
I expect to do more, however, as you would observe from the pursuing
paragraph, for there is a need, if ever there was one, to stand up against
what appears to be regulatory steamrollering. This site is also geared
to be a reasoned, unbiased voice challenging the powers that be with
the time-honoured method of: hypothesis, prediction, experiment and
evaluation using empirical evidence. It is planned that you the reader
will have a crucial role in helping me to meet the stated goals. I welcome
your regular feedback.
BRINGING YOU UPDATE
Planned, or otherwise, approximately one year ago, Offshore Financial
Centers (OFC) were the target of a triple whammy attack. On April 5,
2000 the Financial Stability Forum publicly released the report of their
Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers. With what would normally
be considered commendable, but rarely achieved speed in multilateral
affairs, the Forum released a list of offshore financial centers, in
three broad groups or "merit categories" reflecting their
perceived quality of supervision and degree of cooperation. By June,
the reeling OTCs were to receive another blow. The Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) of the G7 released a list of 15 nations that they
claimed were non-cooperative in anti-money laundering efforts. Rounding
out this seemingly well coordinated attack were the officials at OECD
whose council in that same month approved a report entitled Towards
Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful
Tax Practices.
I believe I need to make it absolutely clear that I have no expertise
or professional interest in such issues as money laundering and tax
evasion. Further, I unreservedly support any measures that would work
towards eliminating such illegal activities. I would not, therefore,
be dealing with such matters, as they are best left to personnel with
such specialized expertise. However, it is necessary to stress what
the Financial Stability Forum itself has pointed out in their report:
The term "offshore" carries with it in some quarters a perception
of dubious or nefarious activities. There are, however, highly reputable
OFCs that actively aspire to and apply internationally accepted practices,
and there are some legitimate uses of OFCs. OFCs are not homogeneous
and there is a wide variety of practices found in them.
In summary, therefore, this site is meant to serve a double and mutually
reinforcing purpose. On the one hand, it is meant to serve as a resource
for those interested in the offshore financial sector. On the other
hand, in what I believe would be a unique role, I shall provide a methodology
for evaluating the various regulatory regimes covering the global financial
services sector. That is: it is my desire to encourage the use of a
common yardstick for evaluating both the onshore and offshore financial
sectors. Why, you might ask, is this necessary? To be sure, you may
consider some of my reasons of little consequence but there is also
one reason of overarching importance that I believe is being purposely
ignored or worse yet, overlooked.
THE CONCERNS-
(1) Fairness issue
Consider that the confrontation, one year on, hasnt slackened.
A Caribbean news report states that on Friday June 22, FATF is slated
to release its 12th annual report and a new report updating its findings
on the non-cooperative countries and territories in the international
fight against money laundering in the offshore financial sector. Interestingly,
while a February 2001 progress report stated that all jurisdictions
had taken impressive and significant strides towards improving their
counter-money laundering regimes, a source close to FATF said that those
Caribbean jurisdictions who had hoped to see their names removed from
the blacklist are likely to be disappointed.
The fairness issue arises because of the appearance of one group making
the rules, judging performance and enforcing sanctions. Not surprisingly,
an international magazine of repute, The Financial Regulator, had this
to say in its September 2000 issue:
The interconnection of the world financial system has created
problematic
externalities, with
small countries now able to do a lot of damage.
With world government some way off, these externalities are likely to
prove tricky to manage. For the foreseeable future there is no better
solution than international cooperation. When big countries push little
countries around, even for the best of reasons, they give this crucial
cooperation a bad name. The challenge for those interested in global
financial stability is to find some way of negotiating better regulation
while avoiding
. the heavy handedness characterizing the current
drive against offshore centres.
(2) Hidden dangers
The central concern of the various national financial market regulators
and BIS is the growing threat that poorly regulated OFCs pose to the
stability of the global financial system. The essence of the Financial
Stability Forums viewpoint can be gleaned from these two, of the
many, points they make in their report:
The significant growth in assets and liabilities of institutions based
in OFCs and the inter-bank nature of the offshore market, together with
suspected growth in the off-balance sheet activities of OFC-based institutions
(about which inadequate data exist), increase the risk of contagion.
The international financial system is increasingly interdependent. Deliberately
(and blatantly) lax supervisory practices in one part of the system
are a potential source of weakness to the entire system. It would be
short sighted, therefore, not to address such practices. My concern
here is that the authorities are refusing to openly acknowledge that
in aggressively mending one part of global monetary and financial "non-system"
they run the risk of making the next financial crisis far worse. Doesnt
the OFCs at this time act as relief valves in the boiler / pressure
cooker type global financial system of this era? Indeed their own report
points out that: "OFCs, to date, do not appear to have been a major
causal factor in the creation of systemic financial problems."
(3) Inappropriate
solutions
Since the Asian crisis of the late nineties there has been a somewhat
hesitant and varying effort to arrive at a new financial architecture.
The complaint of UNCTAD and other such knowledgeable observers is that
the effort to date has been unfortunately one-sided. In short, many
initiatives are underway to reform the financial sectors of developing
countries but very little effort has been targeted at the activities
of the major financial players(banks, hedge funds, etc.) of the developed
world.
Secondly, there will also be a need to ask ourselves in what ways are
this century different than the former. In this regard, we would find
that what the FSF looks on negatively as regulatory arbitrage will in
this era serve as the pivot around which we achieve productivity growth.
Finally, the FSF reforms(cures/standards) are costly, burdensome and
ineffective. By their own reckoning, the assessment resource requirements
for an OFC are given as:
US$ millions
Year 1 $1.4
Year 2 $2
Year 3 $2.2
Bearing in mind that these are mainly small island states with few resources,
one wonders how can this be justified. What is also troubling is that
given the current structure of the regulatory framework worldwide, there
is a severe shortage of regulatory personnel with the requisite knowledge
and uptodate skills in the dynamic and increasingly complex financial
sector. The reality is, in fact, that the developed countries are themselves
struggling to regulate their own financial sector. Witness the difficulties
the UK faced as it attempted to introduce legislation to empower its
financial regulator, The Financial Services Authority.
What is the real problem?
The foregoing should by now alert us to the fact that we have not quite
got a handle on the basic cause of the growing financial instability
in the global economy. I suggest that the problem flows from the absence
of a proper monetary standard since the collapse of the gold
exchange standard in 1971. This, of course, was a difficulty brought
on by the US economy as it suffered declining productivity growth in
the late sixties and following years. It is quite clear, therefore,
that if we are to solve the problem of financial instability we will
need to first address the fundamental economic problem facing the nations
of the world. The experts have indeed indirectly agreed with this point
of view.
In our next article, as we examine the future of OTCs, we shall see
to what extent our New Economy Growth Model can be helpful in
devising a better model for evaluating regulatory standards. You can
visit my own web
site for more information on this.
Opinions expressed by columnists and commentators on this web site,
including letters to the editor, are the views of the writers, and do
not represent those of worldoffshorebanks.com.
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